In this paper, we propose to compare different partial transparency regimes in order to determine the optimal diessmination policy by the central bank, using an experimental approach. A treatment dedicated to the benchmark situation (where information is fully released) is also available. Our experiment is based on subsequent framework of Morris and Shin (2002), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012) . The predictive power of K-level reasoning is an issue that is addressed also in this paper. Our experiment indicates that -when fully disclosed-players overreact to public information and this overreaction is efficiently reduced when the degree of publicity decreases (i.e. when the fragmentation measure increases). The average weight assigned to common signal decreases over treatments, especially when we establish partial transparent strategy (i.e. fragmented information). The results provide support both for and against global games theoretical predictions. In fact, although players overreact to public signal, their behavior is inconsistent with theoretical equilibrium, which means that the destabilizing effect of public information is less pronounced experimentally than when it does in theory. This is not the case when public information is fragmented; subjects' behavior does approach equilibrium. These observations coincide with both a collective and an individual analyses of behavior.
Introduction
Central bank communication is an important aspect in implementing an efficient and effective monetary policy stance. Central banks have focused on greater transparency by enlarging the modes of communication.
Central banks make use of a wide range of communication tools, whose objective is to help private agents to understand the contribution that monetary policy is intended to make to economic and price developments over time and helps to anticipate the broad direction of the monetary policy over the medium term. This guidance reinforces the predictability of policy statements and affects expectations regarding the future path of interest rates, thereby making the policy more effective. Although it is widely accepted that improved transparency of monetary policy and the associated communication have been effective (Trabelsi and Ayadi, 2011) , the question remains if a central bank should reveal more information to the public, thereby making its communication more explicit and forward looking.
The issue of central bank transparency has been discussed in several aspects 1 . This paper relates specifically to the approach taken in coordination games. This strand of literature supports that communication may in certain circumstances, be undesirable and counterproductive , Amato et al. (2002) and Padoa-Schioppa (2004)).
1
There are obviously limits to how information can be digested effectively (Gai and Shin, 2003) . The central bank must be careful to communicate issues on which it may receive noisy signals itself 2 . This issue has been remarkably highlighted by Morris and Shin (2002) in a beauty contest game. Those authors notice that a noisy public signal can lead to greater variability and reduces social welfare when economic agents discard private information in coordinating their actions. Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) argue that communication plays a dual role: on one hand, it provides signals about the private information of the central bank and on the other hand, it serves as a mechanism for coordinating economic agents expectations. They note that the communication can reduce social welfare if agents give more weight to these communications (used as a focal point) and too little on their own information. The central bank can thus coordinate actions away from fundamentals. The result of Morris and Shin (2002) has generated numerous responses and comments, so that Svensson (2006) questioned its plausibility in the sense that the argument advanced by Morris and Shin does not remain in reality. Additionally, Woodford (2003 Woodford ( , 2005 notes that the problem of Morris and Shin (2002) is even less likely to arise if the coordination of private agents is a goal of welfare per se. Amador and Weil (2006) argue that additional public information can create confusion among economic agents, slows the dissemination of private information and can reduce social welfare. However, Pavan (2004, 2007) show that the impact of public information depends on the degree of strategic complementarities.
Most of these theoretical studies on informational structure involve accuracy and information nature (public/private). Recently, we focus on the number of receivers as an important component of information and the number of information (i.e Morris and Shin (2007) , Cornand and Heinemann (2008) ).
In the same context as that of Morris and Shin, Cornand and Heinemann (2008) , argue that welfare improves when more public information is only received by a fraction of market participants. According to these authors, limiting publicity of information can reduce the negative externalities associated with high level of transparency. Indeed, public information must be provided with maximum precision, but is not transmitted to all agents. A restriction on the degree of publicity of information will be more effective in avoiding adverse effects from the public announcement than a restriction on the information accuracy.
The key insight in the analysis of Morris and Shin (2002) is that equilibrium players often place too much weight on public signal relative to that would be used by the social planner. Therefore, individual information is not socially efficient and enhanced public disclosure could hurt social welfare. The generelized framework that we use is a modification of Morris and Shin (2002) , Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012) , respectively. In our setting, just as in the benchmark model, the agents' payoff is determined by two criteria: How well an agent's action matches an unknown state of the world and how well his action matches the average action of other agents. We address in this paper different issues. First, it theoretically analyses the effectiveness of fragmented strategy in reducing the overreaction to public information. Second, it empirically tests the theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment. Third, we draw some policy guidelines regarding strategies to disclose information to the public. We design several experimental treatments that differ from each other in the number of receivers and or the number of information. Although a brief overview of theoretical findings is provided below, this paper focuses particularly on experimental evidence. The reminder of this paper is as follows, section 2 describes our basic model and the theoretical predictions of Trabelsi (2012) ; section 3 presents the experimental design, our main results will be discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
Basics of the theoretical model: Modified model of Morris and Shin and its variants
This section provides a theoretical background for our study. First, based on the Morris and Shin (2007) and on Trabelsi (2012) models, subsequently, we develop the framework that will be used in our experimental design. Then, within this framework, we derive our main results. There are N identical agents, j = 1, 2...N . Agent j chooses an action a i j . The payoff function of agent j is given by:
2 For example, forecasts errors....
Where u 0 is a constant, θ represents the fundamental state. r is the degree of strategic complementarities and it is a constant between 0 and 1.ā −j = 1 N −1 k =j a k is the average action of j's opponents.
The payoff function has three terms. The first one is a constant u 0 and is the highest payoff the individual can possibly earn. The second term reflects the loss from mismatching the underlying fundamental θ and a i j . The third term is the "beauty contest" term. It measures the loss from mismatching the average actions of opponentsā −j . The parameter r measures the relative importance of coordinating with opponents' actions versus matching the underlying state. When u 0 = 0, the game becomes the coordination game specified in Morris and Shin (2002) . When r = 1, the game becomes similar to the beauty contest in the sense that subjects only need to match the average of the other players' actions.
The payoff function differs from Morris and Shin (2002) in three ways 3 : First, we consider a setting with a finite number of players, while in Shin (2002, 2007) , Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012) include a continuum of players. Second, the payoff function of Morris and Shin is always negative, which is difficult to implement in laboratory. By adding a positive term to the original function, we allow participants' payoffs to be positive without altering equilibrium predictions. Third, the distribution of the errors is uniform instead of normal.
Briefly, we characterize the equilibrium with respect to the informational structure in Cornand and Heinemann (2008), in which the public signal y = θ + η is released to a fraction P of the population. Each agent has his private signal x j = θ + ε j .
Both η and ε are i.i.d normally distributed with zero mean and variances σ 2 η and σ 2 ε . The optimal action of an agent j according to whether he receives a public signal or not is as follows:
As in Trabelsi (2012) , before taking actions, agent j will receive two types of signals about θ and we assume that both signals have the same precision α. The first signal is semi-public and is given by:
As for the second type of signals x i j , it is private, which means that it is specific to each agent:
Both η i and ε 
Following Trabelsi (2012) and using the Bayesian update rule, we can show that the unique equilibrium is linear and is given by:
Either by establishing a strategy of partial publicity or a fragmented information, the overeaction to public information is reduced. We can summarize the effect of varying the publicity degree P and the fragmentation measure n, respectively in this short Table: 3 The utility function in the benchmark model of Morris and Shin (2002) 
Since this function is complicated to be implemented in laboratoy, we chose to use (1) . As claimed by Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) , working with the utility function described in (1) has no incidence on the theoretical optimal action given by the expression; a j = (1 − r) E j (θ) + rE j (ā). consequently, it doesn't alter the goals of the paper. A major difficulty in implementing Morris and Shin set up in the lab is to generate θ using an improper uniform distribution. To deal with this problem, we adopted the following strategy: we generate θ using the uniform distribution on interval [a, b] and then given θ, we generated z i and x i j according to (2) and (3).
3 Experimental design matching theoretical model
Payoff function and signals
In all treatments, the payoff function of a subject j is given by:
Where a i j is the action of subject j, that belongs to group i, θ is the unknown true state of the world,ā −j is the average of all subjects' actions except j and r is the relative importance of matching the weighted average of the players' actions.
Since the payoff function given by (6) is more complicated than those in typical laboratory experiments, every effort was made to ensure that subjects understood the payoff structure. First, expression (6) was presented in a simpler manner:
The fact that payoffs could not be negative was explained to the subjects. Second, we took the advantage of the fact that each term has a simple and an intuitive interpretation. We started by verbally explaining that there are two factors that will determine the mismatching the underlying state and the mismatching the average action made by others. After this was understood, we presented the actual mathematical form, explained the meaning of each term, and went through several numerical examples. Finally, during the actual experiment at the end of each period, the first and the second terms have been calculated and displayed together with θ and a −j . This proved to be very helpful for participants since it highlighted how each term in (6) affects the payoff.
All treatments had a quite similar structure and differed only in two aspects: the degree of publicity and fragmentation of the common information, respectively. The state and signals, whether they are public, semipublic or private were generated prior to the experiment. For each period, θ is generated randomly according to a uniform distribution on [50, 950] . Given θ, the signals are independently drawn from a uniform distribution [θ − 10, θ + 10]. Signal y is public and is the same for all participants. Signal z i is semi-public and it is the same for all subjects who belong to the same sub-group i. Signal x i j is private, that is specific to each player.
Treatment and session description
The experimental methodology followed in this paper is close to that of Cornand and Baierswyl (2013) . Two treatments A and B were implemented for this study. They differ with respect to information available to the participants (For parameters and notations, see Table 2 ). Each treatment consists of three stages. We label stage 1 of both treatments A and B as MS (referring to Morris and Shin), in which participants will receive 1 common signal and 1 private signal per subject. Stage 2 and 3 of treatment A are labelled as T (Referring to Trabelsi) , in which participants are divided in n sub-groups, each sub-group receives 1 common signal and 1 private signal per subject. Finally, stage 2 and 3 of treatment B are labelled as CH (referring to Cornand and Heinemann), in which participants receive again one private signal per subject, but the common signal will be disseminated to only a proportion P of the subjects (P =0.50 in stage 2 and P =0.25 in stage 3).
Sessions are based on the one of the two treatments and consist of three stages for a total of 45 periods, three times 15 periods (per stage). The value of r is fixed for all the experiment (r=0.75) 4 . Within each stage, the value of the fragmentation measure n is fixed. We used three values. In each session, we followed an ascending order of the fragmentation measure n = 1, n = 2 and n = 4 . In the case of treatment B, we followed a descending order of the degree of publicity P =1, P =0.50 and P =0.25 (for a detailed overview of treatments, see Table 3 ). The order of stages in both treatments is chosen as we want subjects to overreact first to public information in the first place to analyse how much they adjust to communication strategies (either partial publicity or fragmentation)
5 . Moreover, we had 8 subjects per group playing together allowing to deal with CH and Ttreatments, respectively 6 . 
Adjustment of the theoretical models in the experimental setup
We present in what follows an adjustment of the theoretical setup so that the experiment will be based on those theoretical models (Morris and Shin (2002), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012)) and we also proceed to determine the expressions of the corresponding expected utility (or the gain) that we need later to calculate the theoretical payoff (cf. Appendix D for fixed values used) and compare them whith those realized in the experiment.
Private and public information: The case of Morris and Shin (2002)
In MS-treatment, subjects receive one public signal and a private signal that deviate from θ by some noise. Both signals have a uniform distribution, such that
The action of each subject j on equilibrium is given by :
The average action accross all agents:
Now we derive the expected utility for player j according to (8) 
Private and P-common beliefs: The case of Cornand and Heinemann (2008)
In CH-treatment, subjects receive two types of signals on unknown value of θ that are uniformly distributed such as in MS-treatment with the difference that y will be revealed to only a proportion P = m N of subjects. m is the number of subjects who receive the common signal y and N is the total number of subjects.
The optimal action of each subject is given by:
The average action across all subjects is given by :
To determine the expression of the expected utility function for subjects who receive the public signal and for those who only receive the private signal, we need to get the expression ofā −j
The expected utility function for a subject who gets the public signal (We assumex → θ):
The expected utility function for a subject who only receives a private signal (We assumex → θ):
Aggregating overall subjects:
Note that when m = N , we get exactly the expected utility function of MS-treatment.
Private and semi-public information: The case of Trabelsi (2012)
In T-treatment, there are n semi-public information, observed each by N n subjects:
Each subject j receives, in addition, his proper signal x i j . The optimal action at equilibrium is given by:
The average action except j:
The expected utility function for subject j that belongs to a group i (We assumex → θ):
Note that when n = 1, we get the same expression of the expected utility function of MS-treatment.
Procedural considerations
The experiment was carried at the Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE-LSE) laboratory in Lyon (France). The experiment was computerized using Z-tree software (Fishbacher, 2007) . The 96 subjects who participated in this experiment were split into 12 groups (M=12). Three sessions were devoted to each treatment, producing a total of six independent observations per treatment. Most of the subjects were students. Sessions lasted about one hour, and subjects 'average earnings were about 12€. In each period, subjects have to make a decision on the true state given the signals. For the action choice, subjects were paid according to the payoff function in (7), which was exchanged to the rate of 1000 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit)=1€. Instructions, given in detail in the appendices, were distributed in a written form to subjects and were read out loud before the beginning of each session. It was made sure that these instructions were well understood. Subjects were asked to raise their hands if they had any questions, and answers were given privately by the experimenter 7 .
4 Results and discussion
Some descriptive statistics
First of all, we derive the theoretical predictions relative to the weights attached to the public and semi-public information. The column E i j (θ) of Table 4 corresponds to the weight assigned to the public or the semipublic (either partially disclosed or fragmented) according to the best linear expectation of the true state. The corresponding weights in MS and T stages are given by the following formula: ε ε+η . In CH-stages, the weight becomes P ε ε+η . λ shows the equilibrium weight in the rational behavior for subjects who get the public or the semi-public information, andλ shows the optimal equilibrium over all subjects.
We begin by conducting some descriptive analyses that explore the weight assigned to the public (or semipublic) signal by the subjects in the experiment depending on the treatment. In order to calculate the weights, we proceed as follows: For each treatment and for each group, we caculate the weight on public information using this formula 8 :
where j = 1, 2, ....8 and t = 1, 2, ..., 15 The final observed weights are averaged over subjects and over periods:w = Table 5 provide some initial evidence that subjects tend to overreact -though not so strong-to public signal, especially in MS-treatment. The weights decrease in partial transparent treatments as predicted in theory. The weight assigned to the public (or semi-public) signal is significantly lower than the theoretical value in MS-treatment for all groups 1-12 with a p-value=0.0277. In T-treatments, the hypothesis cannot be rejected (p-values=0.2489 for T1 and 0.4631 for T2)). While rejection is found for groups 7-12 in CH-treatments with the corresponding p-values=0.0277 and 0.0464. The average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal as well as its variance which are aggregated this time by period are also reported in Figure 1 and Figure 3 , respectively. We see clearly that average observed weights are close to the theoretical values in the case of T1, T2, while this is not the case for MS, CH1 and CH2 stages, resp. A visual inspection of Figure 2 , which plots the average weight assigned by each group in each treatment in each of the 15 periods, shows a much larger weight in MS-treatment compared to CH-treatments, while the weights in MS, T1 and T2 are close to each one.
(a) Average weight assigned to public/semi-public signal for Treatment A (1-6) (b) Average weight assigned to public/semi-public signal for Treatment B (7-12) Figure 1 : Average weight assigned to public/semi-public signal for Treatment A and B, th: refers to "theoretical" (a) Average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal for groups [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] (b) Average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal for groups [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Figure 2: Average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal for groups [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] We can state our first result as follows:
• In MS-treatment (1-12): the weight assigned to the public signal is significantly lower than its theoretical value.
• In T-treatments (1-6): the weight that subjects in the experiment attach to the semi-public signal is not significantly different from theoretical values.
• In CH-treatments (7-12): the weight is significantly lower than the theoretical value.
• In CH-informed (7-12), the weight is significantly lower than the theoretical value. The realized along with the theoretical average payoff are reported in the last lines of Table 6 (aggregated by group) and on the Figures 4 and 5 (aggregated by period and by group, respectively). Recall that in order to caculate the theoretical payoff , we need to replace each parameter by its value in the expected utility expression corresponding to each case (MS, T and CH) according to Table 3 and then multiplied by 10, the payoffs are significantly lower than their corresponding theoretical values in most of the treatments. 
Overreaction issue: comparison between theoretical predictions and experimental results
The hypothesis to be tested in this case is: H 0 : the observed weight on the public (resp. semi-public) information by a group M in treatment G is not different from the theoretical weight in E j (θ). We perform for this purpose a non-parametric test: Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test, which is very useful when we would like to compare observed values with fixed ones (cf. Table 7) .
We find that the weight assigned in MS-treatment is significantly larger than its face value for all groups 1-12. The p-value is overwemingly below the 5% significance level. But the same result doesn't hold if we consider seperate groups. For groups 7-12, the hypothesis cannot be rejected anymore.
We can state the second result:
Result 2. For all groups, the weight assigned to public signal is larger than the one attributed in the first order expectation. Subjects do overreact to the common signal. Subjects still overreact to the semi-public information in T1-treatment. But overreaction is efficiently reduced in T2-treatment and also in CH-treatments 9 . 
Comparison between treatments
It is an evidence that CH-treatments differ from MS-treatments by a simple analytical comparison between respective observed weights. However, we should compare between MS and CH1inf (inf refers to "informed" subjects who receive the public signal) and CH2inf, respectively. Let us start with the statistical test conducted for groups the 1-6 only (cf. Table 8) . The hypothesis to be tested is: H 0 : the observed weight on the public (resp. semi-public) information by a group M in treatment G 1 is not different from the weight in treatment G 2 We conduct similarly a non-parametric test: Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test which results in an insignificant difference between MS-treatment and T1-treatments while we can reject the same hypothesis when we compare MS-treatment with T2-treatment (p-value=0.0277). And finally, we reject equality between T1-treatment and T2-treatment with a p-value=0.0464, which seems to be a logical result. This finding corroborates our previous results, that is the reduction of overreaction was efficient in that last phase of the experiment for subjects of groups 1-6. Finally, there are no significant differences between weights assigned in MS, CH1inf and CH2inf.
Result 3.
• The weights assigned in the MS-treatment and T1-treatment, respectively, are significantly larger than in T2-treatment.
• The reduction of overreaction is more efficient when the fragmentation measure n is sufficienlty high.
• The difference between weights assigned in the MS-treatment, CH1inf-treatment and CH2inf is insignifcant. 
Predictive power of K-level reasoning
In k-level thinking models, players have different levels of strategic sophistication, hence behave heterogeneously. When a subject doesn't choose an equilibrium action, this means that he follows a limited level of thinking. The models of limited depth of reasoning are introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1994) and Nagel (1995) and are successful at accounting for systematic deviation from equilibrium behavior. Within the setting introduced in section 2, we derive actions that correspond to different levels of reasoning. Player j chooses a j to maximize (1) (The utility function) and from the first order condition, the best response is:
We define level 0 in which agent is non strategic and randomly choose a number between two signals. Level 1 (L 1 ) player expects that other players are L 0 players. It means that L 1 player believes that average action of other players will be equal to their own estimated state, and so on...In this section, we propose to derive weights put on public, and semi-public information.
Private and public information: The case of Morris and Shin (2002)
Suppose that all players except player j atttach weight τ k 10 to the public signal. The best response of player j to such behavior is :
10 τ 0 corresponds to the weight given by the first order-expectation in E j (θ)
We replace E j (θ) by its expression ( ε ε+η y + η ε+η x j ) and rearranging terms, we get:
By replacing ε, η, and r by their fixed values in the experiment, we get the following weights for the level of reasoning:
Private and P-common beliefs: The case of Cornand and Heinemann (2008)
For subjects who only receive the private signal, they have no choice but playing a j = x j . For subjects who receive both signals:
Averaging over all agents,
By replacing N,m, ε, η, and r by their fixed values in the experiment, we get the following weights for the level of reasoning: All players (except j) attach weight τ k to the semi-public signal. The best response will be :
We replace E i j (θ) by its expression (
) and rearranging terms, we get:
By replacing N,n, ε, η i , and r by their fixed values in the experiment, we get the following weights for the level of reasoning: Table 9 provides a summary of the theoretical weights on public or semi-public according to different levels of reasoning. As we have explained, players use simplified models in order to avoid the complexity of equilibrium. The hypothesis to be tested is:
H 0 : The observed weight is not different from the value of the theoretical weight at level k. Through Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test, we can see that subjects don't have high levels of reasoning in MS-treatment (Table 10 ). On average, subjects' weights are located between L 0 and L 1 (See Figure 6) . The hypothesis cannot be rejected for levels 1 and higher in the case of T1-treatment, while it's rejected in CHtreatments, where the weight is significantly lower for each level k ≥ 1. And the hypothesis is accepted for all levels in the case of T2-treatment. In order to strengthen our previous observations, we propose to complete with an individual analysis of subjects' behavior in the lines of Shapiro et al. (2010) . We see that subjects operate different levels of reasoning depending on the treatment. According to Table 11 , the number of cases in which subjects operate the same level of reasoning as in MS-treatment is higher in T2 than in T1-treatment (20 cases versus 16). This means that players attach importance to "the de-coordination effect" induced by an increase in the fragmentation measure (n = 4), this observation corraborates our result found in section 4.2, where the reduction of overreaction was more efficient in T2-treatment. L1  L1  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0  L1  L0  L1  L1  L0  L0  L2  L0  L2   T1  L0  L1  L0  L0  L∞  L∞  L1  L0  L∞  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0  L1   T2  L∞  L1  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L∞  L∞  L0  L∞  L∞  L∞  L0  L0   Session 2   MS  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L2  L0  L0  L0  L2  L0  L0  L1  L1   T1  L0  L0  L∞  L∞  L∞  L∞  L0  L0  L∞  L∞  L∞  L∞  L0  L∞  L∞  L∞   T2  L0  L0  L0  L0  L∞  L∞  L0  L∞  L∞  L0  L∞  L0  L∞  L0  L1  L∞   Session 3   MS  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0  L0  L1  L0  L0  L1  L∞  L0  L1 L1
Compared to the case of the first experiment (Where we established a fragmented information), in the second experiment, most of the subjects don't seem to follow a level of thinking (cf . Table 12 ). Generally, subjects' weights are located between L 0 and L 1 . Their actions, however, approach equilibrium in the last phase of the game. The number of cases in which players opperate the same level of reasoning as in MS-treatment is higher in CH1-treatment than in CH2-treatment (26 versus 20 cases). 42 subjects out of 48 operate the same level of reasoning in two or more treatments. As the game is complicated from structural point of view, L 1 are not optimally responding to L 0 , whose behaviors are ambiguous. Hence, it is not possible for L 1 to develop optimal strategies.
Overall, in both games, this result is in accordance with that of Nagel (1995) who finds that subjects tend to adhere to the same level of thinking throughout the study in a pure beauty contest game 11 . The theory of K-level show that limited levels of thinking necessarily lead subjects to underweight the public signal compared to equilibrium predictions where players suppose to place much weight on the public signal (cf. Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2004 ). L1  L0  L1  L1  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0   CH1  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0  L0  L1  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0   CH2  L0  L0  L∞  L∞  L∞  L0  L0  L∞  L0  L∞  L0  L∞  L∞  L∞  L∞  L∞   Session 5   MS  L0  L1  L1  L0  L1  L1  L1  L1  L1  L1  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L1   CH1  L1  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L0  L1  L0  L0  L1  L0  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L0   CH2  L∞  L1  L0  L0  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L1  L∞  L0   Session 6   MS  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0   CH1  L0  L0  L1  L1  L∞  L1  L1  L1  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L0  L1   CH2  L0  L∞  L∞  L0  L0  L0  L∞  L0  L0  L1  L0  L1  L0  L0  L0  L0 Finally, we sum up the main results of this paper in comparing experimental evidence to theoretical predictions in terms of informational disclosure policy (see Table 13 ).
The study of Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) didn't permit to choose whether the central bank shall decrease the precision of the information (partial publicity) or disclose the information to only a fraction of the economic agents. Neverthless, while the precision of public information doesn't seem to have an impact on subjects' behavior, the above authors recommend a communication strategy that is based on varying the precision of the central bank's information rather than disclosing the same information to a limited audience. The public signal serves as a focal point. It leads to an overreaction problem by the agents.
Overreaction is detected but not as strong as the theory predicts.
Overreaction is observed and detected but not as strong as the theory predicts. one public signal to a proprtion P of the agents + one private signal (Cornand and Heinemann (2008) A more precise public information disclosed to a proportion P of the agents.
→ overreaction is reduced and welfare is enhanced.
Overreaction is persistent even in the case of establishing partial communication strategies. There are differences between weights in partial publicity and partial transparency treatments, resp. Agents' behavior is not sensitive to varying the precision of public information.
Overreaction is effciently reduced.
n semi-public signal + one private signal (Trabelsi, 2012)
The semi-public signal serves as a focal point to agents belonging to the same group. As it differ from a group to another, agents will no more ignore their proper signal.
None
Overreaction is reduced more efficiently when the fragmentation measure is high.
Our main economic conclusion of our exprimental study is that by either establishing a partial publicity or a fragmented information, the central bank could alleviate overreaction that was meant to lead to a harmful effect to social welfare. From a practical point of view and given the previous results of the study of Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) , fragmentation would be more feasible to be implemented than a partial publicity given the widespread of the media.
Both experimental studies offer ways for central bankers to think strategically about solutions that focus on the best practices and adding values. A recent incident of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) can illustrate markets' overreaction (published in LeTemps.ch). In fact, statements of SNB concerning equities have generated a loss of more than two billion swiss franc of market capitalization, giving suspicion of insider trading. This fact incited SNB to review its communication policy .
Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper is to discuss the efficiency of two different partial transparency strategies, by making them comparable to a policy where the central bank's private information is fully available to all agents (subjects). To do that, we generalize the classical beauty contest setting by using the models of Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012) , respectively, that are initially derived from the canonical framework of Morris and Shin (2002) . Having the experimental design based on Morris and Shin model generates an environment that is more complex than the one used in theory. All payoff function and optimal decision action were re-designed in order to fit the reality, where the number of subjects is finite. The paper provides support both for and against global game's theoretical approach as well as the models of K-level thinking. We conjecture that the reason of these results is that our informational structure involves a private information and that the coordination motive is not sufficiently high. Moreover, as observed behavior is not sensitive to the details of information structure, the precision of information should not be taken into account in future research (Through comparative statistics, Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) didn't find any significance of the effect of the relative precision of public and private signals on subjects' behavior. This is a supplementary justification that we didn't vary the precision of information in our experiment.), but rather we should study the effect of information and other payoff relevant parameters on strategic uncertainty. 
D Parameters values in the expected utility function

